**:** Masso J.,

Barbera S.,

Serizawa S.
**:** Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges

**:**
** ( ):** Elsevier

**:** 1998
** :**
** :** Games and Economic Behavior

** () :** 2
**:** 25

** :** Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S., 1998. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 272-291, 11.

**:** Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the

space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and

all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. Our results build upon and

extend those obtained for cartesian product ranges by Border and Jordan (1983). By

admitting a large set of non-Cartesian ranges, we give a partial answer to the major

open question left unresolved in this pioneering article. We prove that our class is

composed by generalized median voter schemes which satisfy an additional condition,

called the intersection property

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