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**:** 2015
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**:** 56
**:** . ., . . / . 56. .: , 2015. .95-107.

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** (.):** Cournot model, Nash equilibrium, potential game.

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** (.):** The model of several interacting Cournot markets is considered. Some of them are finish good markets while the others are resource markets. The markets interact by sharing the same set of economic agents. Every producer strategically chooses his supply volumes on every finish good market and purchase volume of resources in accordance with technology and accounting for supply effects on prices. We prove that in the case of linear demand and supply functions the model of interacting Cournot markets reduces to a potential game, and, hence, the Nash equilibrium problem is equivalent to some problem of mathematical programming. We also discuss advantages and special features of such representation of interacting oligopolistic and oligopsonistic markets.

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