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: Korgin N
: Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise : : 2014 : .. : Automation and Remote Control () : Volume 75, Issue 5 : Korgin N. A. Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise //Automation and Remote Control. 2014. Vol. 75. . 5. pp. 983-995. : We demonstrate that any sequential allotment rule enjoying strategy-proofness on the domain of single-peaked preference functions can be represented in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of active expertise on the domain of multidimensional single-plateaued preference functions, i.e., a generalized median voter scheme with a tie-breaking rule. : (1134%2FS0005117914050178) : (php) : 2896, : 2127, : 8. |