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. :  04200900023/0049
:  26.1
:   -
:  2009
:   . . / . 26.1. .: , 2009. .270-286.
:   , , ,
(.):  best-choice game, optimal strategy, multistage game, multiple stopping
:   . : m . . , .
(.):  We consider a full-information best-choice game in which each player wants to hire two secretaries. The aim of a player is to maximize the sum of expected applicant' quality values. Two models are considered: m-person best-choice game with the possibility for an applicant to refuse an offer and two-person best-choice game with dominant player. Optimal strategies are obtained. We prove that in the best-choice game with the possibility for an applicant to refuse an offer the players' payoffs don't depend on the total number of players in the game.

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