|
|
|
|
↑ | |
|
| Ordeshook P.C. Game theory and political theory: an introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 511 p.
(: 3161, : 0, : 0)
|
| Owen J.D. The price for leisure. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1969. 169 p.
(: 3163, : 0, : 0)
|
| Pattee H. Hierarchy theory. NY: Braziller, 1973. - 443 p.
(: 3515, : 0, : 0)
|
| Pearce D.G. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection // Econometrica. 1984. 5. 1029 1050.
(: 3084, : 0, : 0)
|
| Perlman R. Labor theory. N.Y.: Wiley, 1969. 237 p.
(: 3229, : 0, : 0)
|
| Peters T.J., Watermann R.H. In search of excellence. NY:H&R, 1982. - 360 p.
(: 3448, : 0, : 0)
|
| Philips L. The economics of imperfect information. Cambridge University Press, 1989. 291 p.
(: 3267, : 0, : 0)
|
| Phlips L. The demand for leisure and money // Econometrica. 1978. Vol. 46. 5. P. 1025 1044.
(: 3004, : 0, : 0)
|
| Poleshuk G.M., Teslya P.N. Incentive systems, managers motivation, innovations: simulation modeling approach. Novosibirsk: IEIE, 1983. - 18 p.
(: 3080, : 0, : 0)
|
| Polinsky A.M., Shavell S., The economic theory of public enforcement of law // Journal of Economic Literature. 2000. Vol. 37. P. 45 - 76.
(: 3059, : 0, : 0)
|
| Porter L.W., Lawler E.E.III, Hackman J.R. Behavior in organizations. N.Y.: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1975. 561 p.
(: 2997, : 0, : 0)
|
| Pratt J. Risk aversion in the small and in the large // Econometrica. 1964. V. 52. . 1. P. 122 136.
(: 3077, : 0, : 0)
|
| Primavera Project Planner: Manual Guide.
(: 2961, : 0, : 0)
|
| Project Management software survey // PM Network. 1996. N 9. P. 27 40.
(: 3039, : 0, : 0)
|
| Radner R. Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal-agent relationship // Econometrica. 1981. V. 49. N 5. P. 1127 1148.
(: 4837, : 0, : 0)
|
| Radner R. Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting // Review of economic studies. 1986. Vol. 53. N 1. P. 43 58.
(: 4875, : 0, : 0)
|
| Radner R. Repeated principal-agent games with discounting // Econometrica. 1985. V. 53. N 5. P. 1173 1198.
(: 4807, : 0, : 0)
|
| Radner R., Myerson R., Maskin E. An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria // Rev. of Econ. St. 1986. Vol. 53. N 1. P. 59 69.
(: 4824, : 0, : 0)
|
| Reingaum J.F., Wilde L. Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework // Journal of Public Economics. 1985. Vol. 26. P. 1 - 18.
(: 3021, : 0, : 0)
|
| Repullo R. The revelation principle under complete and incomplete information / Economic Organizations as Games. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. P. 179 195.
(: 3058, : 0, : 0)
|
| Rey P., Salanie B. Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: on the value of commitment in contracting // Econometrica. 1990. Vol. 58. N 3. P. 597 619.
(: 2991, : 0, : 0)
|
| Riordan M., Sappington D. Commitment in procurement contracting // Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 1988. Vol. 90. 3. P. 357 - 372.
(: 2932, : 0, : 0)
|
| Robbins E., Sarath B. Ranking agencies under moral hazard // Economic Theory. 1998. V. 11. 1. P. 129 156.
(: 2947, : 0, : 0)
|
| Robbins S. Organization theory. Structure, design and applications/ 3-rd edition. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1990.
(: 5432, : 0, : 0)
|
| Robinson P.B. The performance measurement baseline a statistical view // PM Network. 1997. N 6. P. 47 52.
(: 3045, : 0, : 0)
|
| Rochield K.W. The theory of wages. Oxford: Blackwell, 1954. 178 p.
(: 3104, : 0, : 0)
|
| Rogerson W. Repeated moral hazard // Econometrica. 1985. Vol. 53. N 1. P. 69 76.
(: 3043, : 0, : 0)
|
| Rose-Ackerman S. The Economics of Corruption // Journal of Political Economy. 1975. 4. P. 187 - 203.
(: 3228, : 0, : 0)
|
| Ross A.E. Game-theoretic models of bargaining. Cambridge University Press, 1988. 390 p.
(: 3475, : 0, : 0)
|
| Ross I.C. Need satisfaction and employee turnover // Personnel psychology. 1957. Vol. 10. P. 327 338.
(: 3053, : 0, : 0)
|
871 - 900 3299
|
.
|
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
|
. |
© 2007.
|
