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Óñëîâèÿ îòáîðà ñòàòåé
Ñòàòüè
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Çàãðóçêè|↓ Çàãðóçêè çà ìåñÿö| Äàòà
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| Èâàøêèí Å.È. Âçàèìíîå ñòðàõîâàíèå. Ì.: Ðîññèéñêàÿ ýêîíîìè÷åñêàÿ àêàäåìèÿ, 2000. – 87 ñ.
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| Èçðàéëåâà Î.Â. Òåîðèÿ îðãàíèçàöèé: Ó÷åá. ïîñîáèå. ×åëÿáèíñê: Èçä-âî ÞóðÃÓ, 2000. – 47 ñ.
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| Èëüÿñîâ Á.Ã., Ìèðîíîâ Â.Â., Þñóïîâà Í.È. Èåðàðõè÷åñêèå ìîäåëè ïðîöåññîâ óïðàâëåíèÿ: îïèñàíèå, èíòåðïðåòàöèÿ è ëèíãâèñòè÷åñêîå îáåñïå÷åíèå. Óôà: ÓÃÀÒÓ, 1994. - 152 ñ.
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| Èíòåðåñû, ñòèìóëû, õîçðàñ÷åò. Ïåòðîçàâîäñê: Êàðåëèÿ, 1988. – 76 ñ.
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| Èíòðèëëèãàòîð Ì. Ìàòåìàòè÷åñêèå ìåòîäû îïòèìèçàöèè è ýêîíîìè÷åñêàÿ òåîðèÿ. Ì.: Ïðîãðåññ, 1975. - 606 ñ.
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| Èðèêîâ Â.À., Òðåíåâ Â.Í. Ðàñïðåäåëåííûå ñèñòåìû ïðèíÿòèÿ ðåøåíèé. Ì.: Íàóêà, 1999.
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| Èññëåäîâàíèÿ ïî îáùåé òåîðèè ñèñòåì / Ñá. Ïåðåâîäîâ. Ì.: Ïðîãðåññ, 1969. – 520 ñ.
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| Èòåëüñîí Ë.Á. Ìàòåìàòè÷åñêèå è êèáåðíåòè÷åñêèå ìåòîäû â ïåäàãîãèêå. Ì.: Ïåäàãîãèêà, 1964.
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| Êàáà÷åíêî Ò.Ñ. Ìåòîäû ïñèõîëîãè÷åñêîãî âîçäåéñòâèÿ. Ì.: Ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîå îáùåñòâî Ðîññèè, 2000. – 544 ñ.
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| Êàáà÷åíêî Ò.Ñ. Ïñèõîëîãèÿ óïðàâëåíèÿ. Ì.: Ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîå îáùåñòâî Ðîññèè, 2001. – 384 ñ.
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| Êàáèöûí À.Â., Ïàâëîâ Ñ.Ã., ×åðíîìîðñêèé Ä.À. Àêòèâíîå ïðîåêòèðîâàíèå: ìåòîäîëîãèÿ èñïîëüçîâàíèÿ â ðîññèéñêèõ óñëîâèÿõ / Òðóäû ÌÍÏÊ ""Ñîâðåìåííûå ñëîæíûå ñèñòåìû óïðàâëåíèÿ"". Ëèïåöê: ËÃÒÓ, 2002. Ñ. 60 – 61."
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| Êàç Ì.Ñ. Ìíîãîôàêòîðíûå ñèñòåìû çàðàáîòíîé ïëàòû: ó÷åáíîå ïîñîáèå. Òîìñê: ÒÃÓ, 1991. – 140 ñ.
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| Êàëåí÷óê Â.Ô. Àëãîðèòì âû÷èñëåíèÿ îïòèìàëüíîé ïðîöåäóðû ïëàíèðîâàíèÿ // Ìåõàíèçìû óïðàâëåíèÿ ñîöèàëüíî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêèìè ñèñòåìàìè. Ì.: ÈÏÓ, 1988.
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| Êàëìàí Ð., Ôàëá Ï., Àðáèá Ì. Î÷åðêè ïî ìàòåìàòè÷åñêîé òåîðèè ñèñòåì. Ì.: Ìèð, 1971. – 400 ñ.
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| Êàëìûêîâ Ñ.À., Øîêèí Þ.È., Þëäàøåâ Ç.Õ. Ìåòîäû èíòåðâàëüíîãî àíàëèçà. Íîâîñèáèðñê: Íàóêà, 1986. – 223 ñ.
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| Êàíöåëüñîí Ì.Á. Ïåðåðàñïðåäåëåíèå ðåñóðñîâ. Ì.: Íàóêà, 1985.
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| Êàïèöà Ñ.Ï., Êóðäþìîâ Ñ.Ï., Ìàëèíåöêèé Ã.Ã. Ñèíåðãåòèêà è ïðîãíîçû áóäóùåãî. Ì.: Åäèòîðèàë ÓÐÑÑ, 2003. – 288 ñ.
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| Êàðàâàåâ À.Ï. Ìîäåëè è ìåòîäû óïðàâëåíèÿ ñîñòàâîì àêòèâíûõ ñèñòåì. Ì.: ÈÏÓ ÐÀÍ, 2003.
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| Êàðàâàåâ À.Ï. Ïàðåòî-ýôôåêòèâíîñòü ðàâíîâåñèé â àêòèâíûõ ñèñòåìàõ ñ ðàñïðåäåë¸ííûì êîíòðîëåì // Àâòîìàòèêà è Òåëåìåõàíèêà, 2002. ¹ 12. Ñ. 131-146.
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| A guide to the project management body of knowledge (PMBOKÒ guide). 2000. – 215 p.
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| Abba W. Interview // Program Analyst. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. Washington.
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| Abba W.F. Beyond communicating with earned value: managing integrated cost, schedule and technical performance / PMI Symposium. New Orleans, 1995. P. 2 – 6.
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| Abreu D. On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting // Econometrica. 1988. Vol. 56. N 2. P. 383 – 396.
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| Abreu D., Dutta P., Smith L. The Folk theorem for repeated games : a NEU condition // Econometrica. 1994. Vol. 62. N 4. P. 939 – 948.
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| Abreu D., Milgrom P., Pearce D. Information and timing in repeated partnership // Econometrica. 1991. Vol. 59. N 6. P. 1713 – 1733.
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| Abreu D., Pearce D., Starcetti E. Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring // Econometrica. 1990. Vol. 58. N 5. P. 1041 – 1063.
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| Actuarial science / Advances in the statistics science. Vol. 6. Reidel, 1987. – 250 p.
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| Akerlof G., Miyazaki H. The implicit contract theory of unemployment meets the wage bill argument // Review of Economic Studies. 1980. Vol. 48. N 1. Ð. 321 – 338.
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| Alchian A.A. Economic forces at work. Indianapolis, 1977.
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| Aleskerov F., Monjardet B. Utility maximization, choice and preference. Berlin: Springer, 2002.
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