|
|
Óñëîâèÿ îòáîðà ñòàòåé
Ñòàòüè
|
|
Çàãðóçêè|↑ Çàãðóçêè çà ìåñÿö| Äàòà
|
| Christensen D.S. An analysis of costs overruns on defense acquisition contracts // International Journal of Project Management. 1993. Vol. 24. N 3. P. 43 – 48.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5895, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Christensen D.S. The estimate at complete problem: a review of three studies // International Journal of Project Management. 1993. Vol. 24. N 1. P. 37 – 42.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6192, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Christinsen D.S. A review of cost/schedule control systems criteria literature // International Journal of Project Management. 1994. Vol. 25. N 3. P. 32 – 39.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6032, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Clark H.H., Marshall C.R. Definite reference and mutual knowledge / Elements of Dicourse Understanding (ed. By A.K. Joshi, B.L. Webber, I.A. Sag). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 7063, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Cleland D.I., King W.R. Management: a systems approach. N.Y.: McGraw Hill, 1972. – 442 p.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6733, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Clifford N., Crawford V.P. Short-term contracting and strategic oil reserves // Rev. of Econ. St. 1987. V. 54. ¹ 1. P. 311 - 323.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6933, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Coase R.H. The firm, the market, and the law. Chicago, 1988.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 7093, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Coleman J.H. Using cumulative event curves on automotive programs / PMI Symposium. Pittsburgh, 1992. P. 101 – 107.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 7063, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Compte O. Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring // Econometrica. 1998. Vol. 66. ¹ 3. P. 597 – 626.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 7228, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Connely A. Ad-hoc hierarchies for flat-flexible organizations / PMI Symposium. Pittsburgh, 1992. P. 329 – 335.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6740, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Coombs C.H., Dawes M., Tversky A. Mathematical psychology. N.Y.: Englewood Cliffs, 1970. – 419 p.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6930, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Cooper K.G. The rework cycle: benchmarks for the Project manager // International Journal of Project Management. 1993. Vol. 24. N 1. P. 17 – 22.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6989, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Cooper K.G. The rework cycle: why projects are mismanaged // PM Network. 1993. N 2. P. 5 – 7.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6659, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Cooper R. A note on overemployment / underemployment in labour contracts under assymetric information // Econ. Lett. 1983. V.12. ¹ 1. P. 81 - 87.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6174, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Crawford V.P. Long-term relationships governed by short-term contracts // AER. 1988. Vol. 78. N 3. P. 485 – 499.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6764, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Czarnecki M.T. Managing by measuring: How to improve your organization’s performance through effective benchmarking. N.Y.: American management association, 1999.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6360, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| D’Aspermont C., Gerard-Varet L.A. Incentives and incomplete information // Journal of Public Economics. 1979. Vol. 11. N 1. P. 25 – 45.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6706, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dabla-Norris E. A game-theoretic analysis of corruption in bureaucracies. Wash.: IMF, 2000. - 22 p.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6741, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Danzieger L. On employment, wage and risk sharing in labour contracts // Econ. Lett. 1981. V. 8. ¹ 2. P. 181 - 186.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6441, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dasgupta P., Hammond P., Maskin E. On imperfect information and optimal pollution control // Rev. of Econ. St. 1980. V. 47. ¹ 5. P. 857 - 860.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6773, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dasgupta P., Hammond P., Maskin E. The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility // Review of Economic Studies. 1979. Vol. 46. ¹ 2. P. 185 – 216.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5921, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Davidow W., Malone M. The virtual corporation. N.Y.: Harper Business, 1992.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 7115, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Demski J.S., Sappington D. Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents // Journal of Economic Theory. 1984. Vol. 33. N 1. P. 156 – 171.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6279, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Devaux S.A. When the DIPP dips // International Journal of Project Management. 1992. Vol. 22. N 3. P. 45 – 49.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6417, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dewatripont M. Commitment through renegotiation-proof contracts with third parties // Review of economic studies. 1988. Vol. 55. N 3. P. 377 – 389.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5949, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dewatripont M. Renegotiation and information revelation over time: the case of optimal labor contracts // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1989. Vol. 104. N 3. P. 589 – 619.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5908, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dewatripont M., Maskin E. Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information // European Economic Review. 1990. Vol. 34. N 2/3. P. 311 – 321.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6549, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dinsmore P.C. Winning in business with enterprise project management. N.Y.: American management association, 1999.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6046, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Drobny A. Real wages and employment: Keynes monetarism and labor market. NY: Rontledge, 1988. - 239 p.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5842, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Drucker P. Management: tasks, responsibilities, practices. N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1974. – 839 p.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 7085, çàãðóçîê: 822, çà ìåñÿö: 4)
|
Ïóáëèêàöèè
331 - 360 èç 3310
Íà÷àëî
|
Ïðåä.
|
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
|
Ñëåä. |
Êîíåö
ÈÏÓ ÐÀÍ © 2007. Âñå ïðàâà çàùèùåíû
|