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Hart O D

ÔÈÎ:  Hart O D
Îáùåå êîëè÷åñòâî ïóáëèêàöèé àâòîðà â áèáëèîòåêå:  7
Êîëè÷åñòâî ïðîñìîòðîâ ïóáëèêàöèé àâòîðà:  36392
Êîëè÷åñòâî çàãðóçîê ïóáëèêàöèé àâòîðà:  12806
Êîëè÷åñòâî çàãðóçîê ïóáëèêàöèé àâòîðà çà ïîñëåäíèé ìåñÿö:  19
Ïóáëèêàöèè àâòîðà:

O.D. Hart, J. Moore. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm // Journal of Political Economy, V 98 (1990) No 6, pp 1119-1158
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5010, çàãðóçîê: 11192, çà ìåñÿö: 6)
Oliver Hart, John Moore. On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization. NBER Working Papers, 7388. 1999
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5868, çàãðóçîê: 866, çà ìåñÿö: 12)
Hart O.D., Moore J. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation // Econometrica. 1988. V. 56. N 4. P.755 – 785.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5743, çàãðóçîê: 748, çà ìåñÿö: 1)
Grossman S., Hart O. An analysis of the principal-agent problem // Econometrica. 1983. Vol. 51. N 1. P. 7 – 45.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5145, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
Hart O.D. Optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information: an introduction // Review of Economic Studies. 1983. Vol. 50. N 1. P. 3 – 35.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 4942, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
Hart O.D., Holmstrom B. Theory of contracts // Advances in economic theory. 5th world congress. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987. P. 71 – 155.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5569, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
Hart O.D., Tirole J. Contract renegotiation and Coasian dynamics // Rev. of Econ. St. 1988. V. 55. N 4. P. 509 – 540.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 4115, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)

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