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O.D. Hart, J. Moore. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm // Journal of Political Economy, V 98 (1990) No 6, pp 1119-1158
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Oliver Hart, John Moore. On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization. NBER Working Papers, 7388. 1999
(: 5101, : 712, : 1)
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Hart O.D., Moore J. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation // Econometrica. 1988. V. 56. N 4. P.755 785.
(: 5131, : 662, : 6)
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Grossman S., Hart O. An analysis of the principal-agent problem // Econometrica. 1983. Vol. 51. N 1. P. 7 45.
(: 4556, : 0, : 0)
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Hart O.D. Optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information: an introduction // Review of Economic Studies. 1983. Vol. 50. N 1. P. 3 35.
(: 4394, : 0, : 0)
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Hart O.D., Holmstrom B. Theory of contracts // Advances in economic theory. 5th world congress. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987. P. 71 155.
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Hart O.D., Tirole J. Contract renegotiation and Coasian dynamics // Rev. of Econ. St. 1988. V. 55. N 4. P. 509 540.
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