:  Barbera S., Masso J., Neme A.
:  Voting under Constraints
:  
( ):  Elsevier
:  1997
:  
:  Journal of Economic Theory
() :  2
:  76
:  Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Voting under Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 298-321, 10.
:  We consider a broad class of situations where a society must choose from a finite
set of alternatives. This class includes, as polar cases, those where the preferences
of agents are completely unrestricted and those where their preferences are
single-peaked. We prove that strategy-proof mechanisms in all these domains must
be based on a generalization of the median voter principle. Moreover, they must
satisfy a property, to be called the \intersection property,\ which becomes increas-
ingly stringent as the preference domain is enlarged. In most applications, our
results precipitate impossibility theorems. In particular, they imply the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem as a corollary.
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