:  Jackson M, van_den_Nouweland Anne
:  Strongly Stable Networks
:  
( ):  Caltech
:  2001
:  
:  Matthew O. Jackson, Anne van den Nouweland. Strongly Stable Networks // Working Paper, for "Games and Economic Behavior", 2001
:  We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they
coincide with the set of effcient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a \top convexity\ condition on the value function on networks...
:    / 
:  

: (pdf)
: (html)

: 3893, : 1254, : 9.


© 2007.