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јвтор:  Faure-Grimaud Antoine, Laffont J J, Martimort David
Ќазвание:  A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs
—татус:  опубликовано
√од:  1998
“ип публикации:  брошюра
ѕолна€ библиографическа€ ссылка:  A. Faure-Grimaud, J-J. Laffont, D. Martimort. A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs. preprint. 1998
јннотаци€:  We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs.
A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can
acquire soft information about an agentТs productivity. If the supervisor
were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed
supervisor residual claimant for the hierarchyТs profit. Under riskaversion,
the optimal contract trades-off the supervisorТs incentives to
reveal his information with an insurance motive. This contract can be
identified with the one obtained in a simple hard information model of
hierarchical collusion with exogenous transaction costs. Now,
transaction costs are endogenous and depend on the collusion stake,
the accuracy of the supervisory technology and the supervisorТs degree
of risk-aversion. We then discuss various implications of the model for the design and management of organisations.
ѕредмет управлени€:  »нформированность (информационное управление) / —труктура ќ— (управление структурой)
–асширени€ базовой модели:  ћногоуровневые системы / —ообщение информации / Ќеопределенность
ћетод моделировани€:  »ерархические игры /  ооперативные игры

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