:   .., .., ..
:   ( ). II.
:  
:  
:  2018
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:  
:  76
:   .., .., .. ( ). II. // . 76. .: , 2018. .219-238. URL: https://doi.org/10.25728/ubs.2018.76.7
:  
:  , , , , ,
(.):  energy efficiency, funds allocation, incentives, control, management structure, organization
:   . , . . . , . , . . . . . , , . , , , .
(.):  The article consists of two parts. We continue a study of the mechanisms for managing the implementation of complex projects that ensure energy efficiency at the second part of the article. We consider a model for stimulating energy efficiency in the sequence of projects in a multi-project structure and propose the optimal mechanism for this model. This mechanism includes a planning procedure, fines for non-compliance with plans, and a reward function for project results. The article consider the functioning of the system as a game of the Center and successively connected agents implementing projects. The strategy of the Center is to choose a mechanism. Agent strategies are messages to the Center for data about their parameters and selection of the project results. Information about the parameters of the agents is necessary to calculate the plans based on the planning procedure. At the same time, agents may report corrupted data. We show that the proposed optimal mechanism encourages agents to provide reliable information and select results that coincide with the plans. Taking into account the results of the study of the mechanisms of project evaluation and budget allocation, discussed in the first part of the article, we propose approaches to forming the structure of the management system for the implementation of complex projects.

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