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јвтор:  Korgin N
Ќазвание:  Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise
—татус:  опубликовано
√од:  2014
“ип публикации:  стать€ вед.журн.
Ќазвание журнала или конференции:  Automation and Remote Control
Ќомер (том) журнала:  Volume 75, Issue 5
ѕолна€ библиографическа€ ссылка:  Korgin N. A. Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise //Automation and Remote Control. 2014. Vol. 75. є. 5. pp. 983-995.
јннотаци€:  We demonstrate that any sequential allotment rule enjoying strategy-proofness on the domain of single-peaked preference functions can be represented in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of active expertise on the domain of multidimensional single-plateaued preference functions, i.e., a generalized median voter scheme with a tie-breaking rule.

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