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јвтор:  Korgin N.
Ќазвание:  Efficient mechanism for resource allocation with quadratic payments and its realization via an iterative bargaining process
—татус:  опубликовано
√од:  2013
“ип публикации:  доклад
Ќазвание журнала или конференции:  7th IFAC Conference on Manufacturing Modelling, Management, and Control, MIM 2013
ѕолна€ библиографическа€ ссылка:  Korgin N. Efficient mechanism for resource allocation with quadratic payments and its realization via an iterative bargaining process / 7th IFAC Conference on Manufacturing Modelling, Management, and Control, MIM 2013 - Proceedings. 2013. P. 1176-1181.
јннотаци€:  The problem of Pareto-efficient resource allocation among rational agents is considered. The mechanism that implements efficient allocation as Nash equilibrium in case when utility is transferable among agents is offered. The approach to solution of allotment problems as multicriteria public choice problems lies in the basis of this mechanism, that allows to implement Groves-Ledyard mechanism, which was initially designated to the solution of public good problems. It is shown, that there is exist the only Nash equilibrium in a game among agents induced by the mechanism developed. For the case when utility functions are private information of agents, it is shown, that efficient allocation may be realized via an iterative bargaining process based on this mechanism, if agents behave according to Cournot dynamics. Possibility to reduce agentТs messages space to a scalar one in iterative bargaining process is demonstrated. It is also shown that mechanism developed may be inconsistent for some nontrivial agentТs behavior Ц there exist some game solutions which can be reached via iterative bargaining process but are not Nash equilibrium and donТt yield efficient resource allocation.
ћетод моделировани€:  »митационное моделирование

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