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јвтор:  Bondarik V.N., Korgin N.A.
Ќазвание:  Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation
—татус:  опубликовано
√од:  2013
“ип публикации:  стать€ вед.журн.
Ќазвание журнала или конференции:  Automation and Remote Control
Ќомер (том) журнала:  9 (74)
ѕолна€ библиографическа€ ссылка:  Bondarik V.N., Korgin N.A. Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation // Automation and Remote Control. 2013. Volume 74, Issue 9. —. 1557-1566.
јннотаци€:  This paper studies the resource allocation problem based on agentsТ opinions with possible delegation. In other words, any agent can report just some components of the allocation vector as his request. We describe symmetrical anonymous generalized median voter schemes supplemented with delegation procedures; they can be applied for solving the posed problem. Original Russian Text © V.N. Bondarik, N.A. Korgin, 2012, published in Problemy Upravleniya, 2012, No. 5, pp. 26Ц32.

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