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OPTIMAL INCENTIVE OF MANAGERS WITH UNCERTAIN TYPES IN MULTI-TIER FIRM

Sergey Mishin, Institute of Control Sciences of RAS, Moscow, Cand.Sc. (smishin@newmail.ru).

Abstract: optimal incentive problem is solved for managers with uncertain types (skills, efficiency etc.) in multi-tier firm. We have found functions of managers salary and type depending on his or her position in multi-tier hierarchy. Particularly we have proven that higher position causes more qualified managers with more salary. For any managers cost and managers efficiency functions the optimal incentive function has been found. For defined class of functions most efficient (optimal) multi-tier hierarchy can be found by previously developed optimization methods.

Keywords: optimal, incentive, manager, multi-tier, firm, uncertain types.

: (pdf)

: 9795, : 1739, : 12.


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