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:  Incentives in organizations: uncertainty and efficiency
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:  1997
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:  6-th IFAC Symposium on Automated Systems Based on
:   .. Incentives in organizations: uncertainty and efficiency / 6-th IFAC Symposium on Automated Systems Based on Human Skills. Slovenia. Kranjska gora, 1997. P. 274 - 277.
:  Game-theoretical models of incentive mechanisms in organizations are considered. General formulation of incentive problem is introduced and classification of special cases is explored. It is stated below that in most of the incentive models under interval, stochastic and fuzzy uncertainty jump or compensating incentive functions are optimal. The study of the uncertainty role leads to the conclusion that with the growth of uncertainty the guaranteed efficiency of management decreases.
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