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јвтор:  V.N. Burkov, A.K. Enaleev, V.F. Kalenchuk
Ќазвание:  Coalitions under a competition mechanism of resource allocation
—татус:  опубликовано
√од:  1989
“ип публикации:  стать€
Ќазвание журнала или конференции:  Automation and remote control
Ќомер (том) журнала:  12
ѕолна€ библиографическа€ ссылка:  V.N. Burkov, A.K. Enaleev, V.F. Kalenchuk. Coalitions under a competition mechanism of resource allocation // Automation and remote control, 1989. #12. P. 1679-1686.
јннотаци€:  A competition mechanism of resource allocation to n users was considered in [1]. It was shown that, first, the competition mechanism ensures the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the system, which is determined by the strategy of the "best" loser in the competition, and, second, the competition mechanism achieves a nearly optimal allocation. However, we assumed in [1] that the winners and losers did not form coalitions. In this paper, we investigate the conditions for the formation of such coalitions and their impact on the efficiency of the system.

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