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Óñëîâèÿ îòáîðà ñòàòåé
Ñòàòüè
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Çàãðóçêè| Çàãðóçêè çà ìåñÿö|↑ Äàòà
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| Sen A. Collective choice and social welfare. London: Holden-Day, 1970. – 254 p.
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| Sen A. Social choice theory / Handbook on mathematical economics. Vol. 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1986. P. 1073 – 1181.
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| Senge P. The fifth discipline. N.Y.: Doubleday, 1990.
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| Shavel S. Risk-sharing and incentives in the principal and agent relationship // Bell J. of Econ. 1979. V. 10. ¹ 1. P. 55 - 73.
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| Shubik M. Game theory in the social sciences: concepts and solutions. MIT Press, 1991. – 514 p.
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| Simon H. A formal theory of employment relations // Econometrica. 1951. Vol. 19. N 2. P. 293 – 305.
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| Simon H. Administrative behavior. 3-rd edition. N.Y.: Free Press, 1976.
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| Simon R.S. The difference of common knowledge of formulas as sets // International Journal of Game Theory. 1999. Vol. 28. P. 367 – 384.
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| Singh A. A taxonomy of practical Project cost forecasting techniques / PMI Symposium. Chicago, 1997. P. 198 – 204.
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| Singh A. Earned value analysis interface with line of balance / PMI Symposium. Chicago, 1997. P. 193 – 197.
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| Singletary N. What’s the value of earned value // PM Network. 1996. ¹ 12. P. 28 – 30.
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| Skyrme D.J. Capitalizing on Knowledge: from e-business to k-business. Boston: Butterworth Hendemann, 2001. – 331 p.
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| Slinko I. Multiple jobs, wage areas, tax evasion and labor supply in Russia. Moscow: New Economic School. Working Paper #BSP/99/018, 1999. – 35 p.
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| Spear S.S., Srivastava S. On repeated moral hazard with discounting // Rev. of Econ. St. 1987. V. 54. N 4. P. 599 – 617.
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| Sprumont Y. The division problem with single-peaked preferences: a characterization of the uniform allocation rule // Econometrica. 1991. Vol. 59. ¹ 2. P. 509 - 519.
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| Stahl D.O., Wilson P.W. Experimental evidence on players’ models of other players // Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 1994. Vol. 25. P. 309 – 327.
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| Tabtabai H.M. Forecasting Project completion date using judgmental analysis / PMI Symposium. Pittsburgh, 1992. P. 436 – 440.
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| Tabtabai H.M. Modeling knowledge and experience to predict Project performance / PMI Symposium. Boston, 1996. P. 1 – 4.
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| Tanaka H. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a successful forecasting theory / Proceedings of XII International Conference on Systems Science. Wroclaw, 1995.
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| Taylor F. The principles of scientific management. N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1914.
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| Taylor J. Aggregate dynamics and staggered contracts // Journal of Political Economy. 1980. Vol. 88. N 1. P. 1 – 23.
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| Thambhain H.J. Best practices for controlling technology-based projects according to plan / PMI Symposium. New Orleans, 1995. P. 550 – 559.
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| Thomas J., Worral T. Self-enforcing wage contracts // Rev. of Econ. St. 1988. V. 55. N 4. P. 541 – 554.
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| Thomson W. Cooperative models of bargaining / Handbook in Game Theory. N.Y.: North-Holland, 1994. Chapter 35. P. 1237 – 1248.
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| Tirole J. Incomplete contracts: where do we stand // Econometrica. 1999. Vol. 67. ¹ 4. P. 741 – 782.
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| Tirole J. Procurement and renegotiation // Journal of Political Economy. 1986. Vol. 94. N 2. P. 235 – 259.
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| Titarenko B. “Robust technology” in risk management // International Journal of Project Management. 1996. Vol. 15. ¹ 1. P. 11 – 14.
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| Toney F., Powers R. Project manager pay // Proceedings of 27-th Annual PMI Symposium. Boston, 1996.
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