|
|
|
|
↑ | |
|
| Nash J.F. Non-cooperative games / Ann. Math. 1951. Vol. 54. P. 286 295.
(: 4432, : 0, : 0)
|
| Nash J.F. The bargaining problem // Econometrica. 1950. Vol. 18. P. 155 162.
(: 3768, : 0, : 0)
|
| Negraponte N. The architecture machine: towards a more human environment. MIT Press. Cambridge, 1970.
(: 4986, : 0, : 0)
|
| Newell M. Estimating techniques that will revolutionize your projects / PMI Symposium. Boston, 1996. P. 1 5.
(: 3787, : 0, : 0)
|
| Nicherson D., Sandler T. Intertemporal incentive allocation in simple hierarchies // Mathematical Social Sciences. 1984. Vol. 7. 1. P. 33 - 57.
(: 3696, : 0, : 0)
|
| Nosal E. Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space // Economic Theory. 1997. Vol. 10. 3. P. 413 436.
(: 3746, : 0, : 0)
|
| Opsahl R.L., Dunnete M.D. The role of financial compensation in industrial motivation // Psychological Bulletin. 1966. Vol. P. 94 118.
(: 3710, : 0, : 0)
|
| Ordeshook P.C. Game theory and political theory: an introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 511 p.
(: 3882, : 0, : 0)
|
| Owen J.D. The price for leisure. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1969. 169 p.
(: 3884, : 0, : 0)
|
| Pattee H. Hierarchy theory. NY: Braziller, 1973. - 443 p.
(: 4330, : 0, : 0)
|
| Pearce D.G. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection // Econometrica. 1984. 5. 1029 1050.
(: 3804, : 0, : 0)
|
| Perlman R. Labor theory. N.Y.: Wiley, 1969. 237 p.
(: 3978, : 0, : 0)
|
| Peters T.J., Watermann R.H. In search of excellence. NY:H&R, 1982. - 360 p.
(: 4200, : 0, : 0)
|
| Philips L. The economics of imperfect information. Cambridge University Press, 1989. 291 p.
(: 3977, : 0, : 0)
|
| Phlips L. The demand for leisure and money // Econometrica. 1978. Vol. 46. 5. P. 1025 1044.
(: 3768, : 0, : 0)
|
| Poleshuk G.M., Teslya P.N. Incentive systems, managers motivation, innovations: simulation modeling approach. Novosibirsk: IEIE, 1983. - 18 p.
(: 3830, : 0, : 0)
|
| Polinsky A.M., Shavell S., The economic theory of public enforcement of law // Journal of Economic Literature. 2000. Vol. 37. P. 45 - 76.
(: 3798, : 0, : 0)
|
| Porter L.W., Lawler E.E.III, Hackman J.R. Behavior in organizations. N.Y.: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1975. 561 p.
(: 3813, : 0, : 0)
|
| Pratt J. Risk aversion in the small and in the large // Econometrica. 1964. V. 52. . 1. P. 122 136.
(: 3843, : 0, : 0)
|
| Primavera Project Planner: Manual Guide.
(: 3688, : 0, : 0)
|
| Project Management software survey // PM Network. 1996. N 9. P. 27 40.
(: 3800, : 0, : 0)
|
| Radner R. Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal-agent relationship // Econometrica. 1981. V. 49. N 5. P. 1127 1148.
(: 5990, : 0, : 0)
|
| Radner R. Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting // Review of economic studies. 1986. Vol. 53. N 1. P. 43 58.
(: 6007, : 0, : 0)
|
| Radner R. Repeated principal-agent games with discounting // Econometrica. 1985. V. 53. N 5. P. 1173 1198.
(: 5916, : 0, : 0)
|
| Radner R., Myerson R., Maskin E. An example of a repeated partnership game with discounting and with uniformly inefficient equilibria // Rev. of Econ. St. 1986. Vol. 53. N 1. P. 59 69.
(: 5905, : 0, : 0)
|
| Reingaum J.F., Wilde L. Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework // Journal of Public Economics. 1985. Vol. 26. P. 1 - 18.
(: 3732, : 0, : 0)
|
| Repullo R. The revelation principle under complete and incomplete information / Economic Organizations as Games. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. P. 179 195.
(: 3774, : 0, : 0)
|
| Rey P., Salanie B. Long-term, short-term and renegotiation: on the value of commitment in contracting // Econometrica. 1990. Vol. 58. N 3. P. 597 619.
(: 3697, : 0, : 0)
|
| Riordan M., Sappington D. Commitment in procurement contracting // Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 1988. Vol. 90. 3. P. 357 - 372.
(: 3635, : 0, : 0)
|
| Robbins E., Sarath B. Ranking agencies under moral hazard // Economic Theory. 1998. V. 11. 1. P. 129 156.
(: 3640, : 0, : 0)
|
871 - 900 3306
|
.
|
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
|
. |
© 2007.
|
