|
|
|↓ |
|
Muelbauer J. Linear aggregation in the neoclassical labor supply // Review of Economic Studies. 1981. Vol. 48. N 1. P. 21 36.
(: 3222, : 0, : 0)
|
Murray H.A. Explorations in personality. N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968. 379 p.
(: 3587, : 0, : 0)
|
Myerson R.B. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems // Journal of Math. Economy. 1982. Vol. 10. 1. P. 67 81.
(: 3641, : 0, : 0)
|
Nagel R. Experimental results on interactive competitive guessing // American Economic Review. 1995. Vol. 85. 6. P. 1313 1326.
(: 4370, : 0, : 0)
|
Nalebuff B., Stiglitz J. Prices and incentives: toward a general theory of compensation and competition // Bell Journal of Economics. 1983. Vol. 14. P. 21 43.
(: 3784, : 0, : 0)
|
Nash J.F. Non-cooperative games / Ann. Math. 1951. Vol. 54. P. 286 295.
(: 4431, : 0, : 0)
|
Nash J.F. The bargaining problem // Econometrica. 1950. Vol. 18. P. 155 162.
(: 3767, : 0, : 0)
|
Negraponte N. The architecture machine: towards a more human environment. MIT Press. Cambridge, 1970.
(: 4985, : 0, : 0)
|
Newell M. Estimating techniques that will revolutionize your projects / PMI Symposium. Boston, 1996. P. 1 5.
(: 3786, : 0, : 0)
|
Nicherson D., Sandler T. Intertemporal incentive allocation in simple hierarchies // Mathematical Social Sciences. 1984. Vol. 7. 1. P. 33 - 57.
(: 3695, : 0, : 0)
|
Nosal E. Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space // Economic Theory. 1997. Vol. 10. 3. P. 413 436.
(: 3745, : 0, : 0)
|
Novikov D.A. Incentives in multi-agent systems / 2-nd Workshop on Agent-based simulation. Passau, Germany, 2001 (April 2-4). P. 134 137.
(: 7193, : 1003, : 5)
|
Novikov D.A. Management of active systems: stability or efficiency // Systems science. 2001. Vol. 26. 2. P. 85 93.
(: 7465, : 1036, : 7)
|
Opsahl R.L., Dunnete M.D. The role of financial compensation in industrial motivation // Psychological Bulletin. 1966. Vol. P. 94 118.
(: 3709, : 0, : 0)
|
Ordeshook P.C. Game theory and political theory: an introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 511 p.
(: 3881, : 0, : 0)
|
Owen J.D. The price for leisure. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1969. 169 p.
(: 3883, : 0, : 0)
|
Pattee H. Hierarchy theory. NY: Braziller, 1973. - 443 p.
(: 4329, : 0, : 0)
|
Pearce D.G. Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection // Econometrica. 1984. 5. 1029 1050.
(: 3803, : 0, : 0)
|
Perlman R. Labor theory. N.Y.: Wiley, 1969. 237 p.
(: 3977, : 0, : 0)
|
Peters T.J., Watermann R.H. In search of excellence. NY:H&R, 1982. - 360 p.
(: 4199, : 0, : 0)
|
Philips L. The economics of imperfect information. Cambridge University Press, 1989. 291 p.
(: 3976, : 0, : 0)
|
Phlips L. The demand for leisure and money // Econometrica. 1978. Vol. 46. 5. P. 1025 1044.
(: 3767, : 0, : 0)
|
Poleshuk G.M., Teslya P.N. Incentive systems, managers motivation, innovations: simulation modeling approach. Novosibirsk: IEIE, 1983. - 18 p.
(: 3829, : 0, : 0)
|
Polinsky A.M., Shavell S., The economic theory of public enforcement of law // Journal of Economic Literature. 2000. Vol. 37. P. 45 - 76.
(: 3797, : 0, : 0)
|
Porter L.W., Lawler E.E.III, Hackman J.R. Behavior in organizations. N.Y.: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1975. 561 p.
(: 3812, : 0, : 0)
|
Pratt J. Risk aversion in the small and in the large // Econometrica. 1964. V. 52. . 1. P. 122 136.
(: 3842, : 0, : 0)
|
Primavera Project Planner: Manual Guide.
(: 3687, : 0, : 0)
|
Project Management software survey // PM Network. 1996. N 9. P. 27 40.
(: 3799, : 0, : 0)
|
Radner R. Monitoring cooperative agreements in a repeated principal-agent relationship // Econometrica. 1981. V. 49. N 5. P. 1127 1148.
(: 5989, : 0, : 0)
|
Radner R. Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting // Review of economic studies. 1986. Vol. 53. N 1. P. 43 58.
(: 6006, : 0, : 0)
|
541 - 570 3306
|
.
|
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
|
. |
|
© 2007.
|