|
|
Óñëîâèÿ îòáîðà ñòàòåé
Ñòàòüè
|
|
Çàãðóçêè| Çàãðóçêè çà ìåñÿö|↓ Äàòà
|
| Fagin R., Halpern J., Vardi M.Y. A model-theoretic analysis of knowledge // Journal of Assoc. Comput. Mach. 1991. Vol. 38. ¹ 2. P. 382 – 428.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 3606, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Fagin R., Halpern J., Moses Y., Vardi M.Y. Reasoning about knowledge. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 4624, çàãðóçîê: 729, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Fagin R., Halpern J., Moses Y., Vardi M.Y. Common knowledge revisited // Annals of Pure and Applied Logic. 1999. Vol. 96. P. 89 – 105.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 3602, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Fagin R., Geanakoplos J., Halpern J.Y., Vardi M.Y. The hierarchical approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge // International Jounal of Game Theory. 1999. Vol. 28. P. 331 – 365.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 3596, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Evans G. Sequential bargaining with correlated values // Review of economic studies. 1989. Vol. 56. N 4. P. 499 – 510.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 3635, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Eaton B.C., White W.D. Agent compensation and the limits of bonding // Economic Inquiry. 1982. 20. P. 330 – 343.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 3377, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dunn L.F. Measurement of internal income-leisure tradeoffs // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1979. Vol. 93. N 3. P. 373 – 393.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6019, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dunn L.F. An empirical indifference function for income and leisure // Review of Economics and Statistics. 1978. Vol. 60. P. 533 – 540.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5818, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Drucker P. People and performance. London: Heinemann, 1977. - 366 p.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6002, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Drucker P. Management: tasks, responsibilities, practices. N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1974. – 839 p.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 7085, çàãðóçîê: 822, çà ìåñÿö: 4)
|
| Drobny A. Real wages and employment: Keynes monetarism and labor market. NY: Rontledge, 1988. - 239 p.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5842, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dinsmore P.C. Winning in business with enterprise project management. N.Y.: American management association, 1999.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6046, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dewatripont M., Maskin E. Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information // European Economic Review. 1990. Vol. 34. N 2/3. P. 311 – 321.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6549, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dewatripont M. Renegotiation and information revelation over time: the case of optimal labor contracts // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1989. Vol. 104. N 3. P. 589 – 619.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5908, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dewatripont M. Commitment through renegotiation-proof contracts with third parties // Review of economic studies. 1988. Vol. 55. N 3. P. 377 – 389.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5949, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Devaux S.A. When the DIPP dips // International Journal of Project Management. 1992. Vol. 22. N 3. P. 45 – 49.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6417, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Demski J.S., Sappington D. Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents // Journal of Economic Theory. 1984. Vol. 33. N 1. P. 156 – 171.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6279, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Davidow W., Malone M. The virtual corporation. N.Y.: Harper Business, 1992.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 7115, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dasgupta P., Hammond P., Maskin E. The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility // Review of Economic Studies. 1979. Vol. 46. ¹ 2. P. 185 – 216.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 5921, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dasgupta P., Hammond P., Maskin E. On imperfect information and optimal pollution control // Rev. of Econ. St. 1980. V. 47. ¹ 5. P. 857 - 860.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6773, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Danzieger L. On employment, wage and risk sharing in labour contracts // Econ. Lett. 1981. V. 8. ¹ 2. P. 181 - 186.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6441, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Dabla-Norris E. A game-theoretic analysis of corruption in bureaucracies. Wash.: IMF, 2000. - 22 p.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6741, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| D’Aspermont C., Gerard-Varet L.A. Incentives and incomplete information // Journal of Public Economics. 1979. Vol. 11. N 1. P. 25 – 45.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6706, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Czarnecki M.T. Managing by measuring: How to improve your organization’s performance through effective benchmarking. N.Y.: American management association, 1999.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6360, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Crawford V.P. Long-term relationships governed by short-term contracts // AER. 1988. Vol. 78. N 3. P. 485 – 499.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6764, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Cooper R. A note on overemployment / underemployment in labour contracts under assymetric information // Econ. Lett. 1983. V.12. ¹ 1. P. 81 - 87.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6174, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Cooper K.G. The rework cycle: why projects are mismanaged // PM Network. 1993. N 2. P. 5 – 7.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6659, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Cooper K.G. The rework cycle: benchmarks for the Project manager // International Journal of Project Management. 1993. Vol. 24. N 1. P. 17 – 22.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6989, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Coombs C.H., Dawes M., Tversky A. Mathematical psychology. N.Y.: Englewood Cliffs, 1970. – 419 p.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6930, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
| Connely A. Ad-hoc hierarchies for flat-flexible organizations / PMI Symposium. Pittsburgh, 1992. P. 329 – 335.
(ïðîñìîòðîâ: 6740, çàãðóçîê: 0, çà ìåñÿö: 0)
|
Ïóáëèêàöèè
2941 - 2970 èç 3310
Íà÷àëî
|
Ïðåä.
|
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
|
Ñëåä. |
Êîíåö
ÈÏÓ ÐÀÍ © 2007. Âñå ïðàâà çàùèùåíû
|