Brayfield A.H., Crockett W.H. Employee attitudes and employee performance // Psychological Bulletin. 1955. Vol. 52. P. 396 424. 
(: 5675, : 0, : 0)
 
Bubshait K.A., Selen W.J. Project characteristics that influence the implementation of Project Management techniques: a survey // International Journal of Project Management. 1992. Vol. 23. N 2. P. 43 47. 
(: 6183, : 0, : 0)
 
Burkov V.N., Enaleev A.K. Stimulation and decision-making in the active systems theory: review of problems and new results // Mathematical Social Sciences. 1994. Vol. 27. P. 271 291. 
(: 8676, : 0, : 0)
 
Camerer C., Weigelt K. Information mirages in experimental asset markets // Journal of Business. 1991. Vol. 64. P. 463 493. 
(: 5051, : 0, : 0)
 
Chander P., Wilde L. A general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement // Review of Economic Studies. 1998. Vol. 65. P.165 - 183. 
(: 5038, : 0, : 0)
 
Chander P., Wilde L. Corruption in tax administration // Journal of public Economics. 1992. Vol. 49. 2. P. 333 - 349. 
(: 5091, : 0, : 0)
 
Chari V. Involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1983. Supplement. P. 19 36. 
(: 4771, : 0, : 0)
 
Christensen D.S. An analysis of costs overruns on defense acquisition contracts // International Journal of Project Management. 1993. Vol. 24. N 3. P. 43 48. 
(: 4729, : 0, : 0)
 
Christensen D.S. The estimate at complete problem: a review of three studies // International Journal of Project Management. 1993. Vol. 24. N 1. P. 37 42. 
(: 4988, : 0, : 0)
 
Christinsen D.S. A review of cost/schedule control systems criteria literature // International Journal of Project Management. 1994. Vol. 25. N 3. P. 32 39. 
(: 4847, : 0, : 0)
 
Clifford N., Crawford V.P. Short-term contracting and strategic oil reserves // Rev. of Econ. St. 1987. V. 54. 1. P. 311 - 323. 
(: 5629, : 0, : 0)
 
Compte O. Communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring // Econometrica. 1998. Vol. 66. 3. P. 597 626. 
(: 5951, : 0, : 0)
 
Cooper K.G. The rework cycle: benchmarks for the Project manager // International Journal of Project Management. 1993. Vol. 24. N 1. P. 17 22. 
(: 5603, : 0, : 0)
 
Cooper K.G. The rework cycle: why projects are mismanaged // PM Network. 1993. N 2. P. 5 7. 
(: 5366, : 0, : 0)
 
Cooper R. A note on overemployment / underemployment in labour contracts under assymetric information // Econ. Lett. 1983. V.12. 1. P. 81 - 87. 
(: 4877, : 0, : 0)
 
Crawford V.P. Long-term relationships governed by short-term contracts // AER. 1988. Vol. 78. N 3. P. 485 499. 
(: 5441, : 0, : 0)
 
DAspermont C., Gerard-Varet L.A. Incentives and incomplete information // Journal of Public Economics. 1979. Vol. 11. N 1. P. 25 45. 
(: 5402, : 0, : 0)
 
Danzieger L. On employment, wage and risk sharing in labour contracts // Econ. Lett. 1981. V. 8. 2. P. 181 - 186. 
(: 5205, : 0, : 0)
 
Dasgupta P., Hammond P., Maskin E. On imperfect information and optimal pollution control // Rev. of Econ. St. 1980. V. 47. 5. P. 857 - 860. 
(: 5446, : 0, : 0)
 
Dasgupta P., Hammond P., Maskin E. The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility // Review of Economic Studies. 1979. Vol. 46. 2. P. 185 216. 
(: 4628, : 0, : 0)
 
Demski J.S., Sappington D. Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents // Journal of Economic Theory. 1984. Vol. 33. N 1. P. 156 171. 
(: 5031, : 0, : 0)
 
Devaux S.A. When the DIPP dips // International Journal of Project Management. 1992. Vol. 22. N 3. P. 45 49. 
(: 5207, : 0, : 0)
 
Dewatripont M. Commitment through renegotiation-proof contracts with third parties // Review of economic studies. 1988. Vol. 55. N 3. P. 377 389. 
(: 4716, : 0, : 0)
 
Dewatripont M. Renegotiation and information revelation over time: the case of optimal labor contracts // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1989. Vol. 104. N 3. P. 589 619. 
(: 4665, : 0, : 0)
 
Dewatripont M., Maskin E. Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information // European Economic Review. 1990. Vol. 34. N 2/3. P. 311 321. 
(: 5290, : 0, : 0)
 
Dunn L.F. An empirical indifference function for income and leisure // Review of Economics and Statistics. 1978. Vol. 60. P. 533 540. 
(: 4588, : 0, : 0)
 
Dunn L.F. Measurement of internal income-leisure tradeoffs // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1979. Vol. 93. N 3. P. 373 393. 
(: 4791, : 0, : 0)
 
Eaton B.C., White W.D. Agent compensation and the limits of bonding // Economic Inquiry. 1982. 20. P. 330 343. 
(: 2787, : 0, : 0)
 
Evans G. Sequential bargaining with correlated values // Review of economic studies. 1989. Vol. 56. N 4. P. 499 510. 
(: 2997, : 0, : 0)
 
Fagin R., Geanakoplos J., Halpern J.Y., Vardi M.Y. The hierarchical approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge // International Jounal of Game Theory. 1999. Vol. 28. P. 331 365. 
(: 2857, : 0, : 0)
 

91 - 120 895
| . | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | . |


© 2007.