|
|
Common Knowledge
: Geanakoplos J. .
:
( ): Elseiver
: 1994
:
: Handbook of Game Theory
: Vol. 2
: Geanakoplos J. Common Knowledge / Handbook of Game Theory. Vol. 2. Amsterdam: Elseiver, 1994. P. 1438 1496.
: ( )
:
:
:
: 4567, : 0
|
|
|
|
|
Management essentials
: Glueck W. F.
:
( ): The Dryden Press
: 1979
:
: Glueck W.F. Management essentials. Hinsdale, Illinoise: The Dryden Press, 1979. 314 p.
:
: 3760, : 0
|
|
|
|
|
Notes on database operating system
: Gray J. .
:
( ): Springer
: 1978
:
: Operating Systems: An Advanced Course. Lecture Not
: Vol. 66
: Gray J. Notes on database operating system / Operating Systems: An Advanced Course. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 66. Berlin: Springer, 1978.
:
:
: 3883, : 0
|
|
|
|
Incentives in teams
: Groves T. .
:
: 1973
:
: Econometrica
() : 4
: Vol. 41
: Groves T. Incentives in teams // Econometrica. 1973. Vol. 41. N 4. P. 617 631.
: Game theoretical incentive problem in the framework of the fuzzy principal-agent model is considered and optimal incentive schemes are constructed. The guaranteed efficiency of management under fuzzy uncertainty is shown to be lower than the deterministic one and decreased with the growth of uncertainty.
: ( )
:
:
:
: 3749, : 0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Theory of contracts
: Hart O. D. / Holmstrom B. .
:
( ): Cambridge Univ. Press
: 1987
:
: 5-th world congress
: Hart O.D., Holmstrom B. Theory of contracts // Advances in economic theory. 5th world congress. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987. P. 71 155.
: ( )
:
:
:
: 4675, : 0
|
Incomplete contracts and renegotiation
: Hart O. D. / Moore J. .
:
: 1988
:
: Econometrica
() : 4
: Vol.56
: Hart O.D., Moore J. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation // Econometrica. 1988. V. 56. N 4. P.755 785.
: .
When drawing up a contract, it is often impracticable for the parties to specify all the relevant contingencies. In particular, they may be unable to describe the states of the world in enough detail that an outsider (the courts) could later verify which state had occurred, and so the contract will be incomplete. The parties can make up for this incompleteness to some extent bybuilding into the contract a mechanism for revising the terms of trade as they each receive information about benefits and costs. One striking conclusion of our analysis is that because the parties can rescind the original contract and write a new one, severe limitations are placed on the form the revisions can take. Moreover, these limitations depend crucially on what means of communication the parties have at their disposal during the revision process. We characterize an optimal contract in two cases. First, when a contract is being used to facilitate trade between two agents who must undertake relationship-specific investments, it is generally not possible to implement the first-best. Fora a particular example, we are able to confirm the idea that the second-best outcome will involve under-investment. Second, when a contract is being used to share risk, and there are no specific investments, we find that it is possible to implement the first-best provided messages sent between the agents can be publicly verified ( JSTOR).
: ( )
:
:
:
: () : 4847, : 622
|