Renegotiation in finitely repeated games


:  Benoit J. . / Krishna V. .
:  
:  1993
:  
:  Econometrica
() :  2
:  Vol. 61
:  Benoit J.-P., Krishna V. Renegotiation in finitely repeated games // Econometrica. 1993. Vol. 61. N 2. P. 303 323.
:  

: 5617, : 0


Rationalizable strategic behavior


:  Bernheim D. .
:  
:  1984
:  
:  Econometrica
() :  5
:  Bernheim D. Rationalizable strategic behavior // Econometrica. 1984. 5. P. 1007 1028.
:  

: 5898, : 0


Choice among wage-hours packages: an empirical investigation of male labor supply


:  Biddle J. . / Zarkin G. .
:  
:  1989
:  
:  Journal of labor economics
() :  41
:  Vol. 7
:  Biddle J., Zarkin G. Choice among wage-hours packages: an empirical investigation of male labor supply // Journal of labor economics. 1989. Vol. 7. . 41. P.415 437.
:  

: 5620, : 0


Game theory and the social contract


:  Binmore K. G.
:  
( ):  MIT Press
:  1998
:  
:  Binmore K. Game theory and the social contract. MIT Press, 1998. 589 p.
:  
:  

: 5581, : 0


Perfect equilibria in bargaining models


:  Binmore K. G.
:  
( ):  Blackwell
:  1987
:  
:  The Economics of bargaining
:  Binmore K.G. Perfect equilibria in bargaining models / The Economics of bargaining. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987.
:  
:  

: 5788, : 0


Enhancing productivity trough project management


:  Blanchard F. . / Hassold R. .
:  
:  1996
:  
:  Proceedings of 27-th Annual PMI Symposium
:  Blanchard F., Hassold R. Enhancing productivity trough project management // Proceedings of 27-th Annual PMI Symposium. Boston, 1996.
:  

: 5423, : 0


Does Competition Kill Corruption?


:  Bliss C. . / Tella R. D.
:  
:  1997
:  
:  Journal of Political Economy
() :  5
:  Vol. 105
:  Bliss C., Tella R. D. Does Competition Kill Corruption? // Journal of Political Economy. 1997. Vol. 105. 5. P. 1001 - 1023.
:  

: 5554, : 0


Renegotiation and the dynamics of contract design


:  Bolton P. .
:  
:  1990
:  
:  European Economic Review
() :  03.
:  Vol. 34
:  Bolton P. Renegotiation and the dynamics of contract design // European Economic Review. 1990. Vol. 34. N 2/3. P. 303 310.
:   ( )
:  
:  

: 5363, : 0


Straightforward elections, unanimity and phantom voters


:  Border K. C. / Jordan J. S.
:  
:  1983
:  
:  Review of Economic Studies
() :  1
:  Vol. 50
:  Border K., Jordan J.S. Straightforward elections, unanimity and phantom voters // Review of Economic Studies. 1983. Vol. 50. N 1. P. 153 170.
:  Non-manipulable direct revelation social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is a euclidean space and all voters have separable star-shaped preferences with a global optimum. If a non-manipulable choice function satisfies a weak unanmity-respecting condition (which is equivalent to having an unrestricted range) then it will depend only on voters' ideal points. Further, such a choice function will decompose into a product of one-dimensional mechanisms in the sense that each coordinate of the chosen point depends only on the respective coordinate of the voters' ideal points. Each coordinate function will also be non-manipulable and respect unanimity. Such one-dimensional mechanisms are uncompromising in the sense that voters cannot take an extreme position to influence the choice to their advantage. Two characterizations of uncompromising choice functions are presented. One is in terms of a continuity condition, the other in terms of \phantom voters\, i.e. those points which are chosen which are not any voter's ideal point. There are many such mechanisms which are not dictatorial. However, if differentiability is required of the choice function, this forces it to be either constant or dictatorial. In the multidimensional case, non-separability of preferences leads to dictatorship, even if preferences are restricted to be quadratic.
:   ( )
:  
:    / 


: ()
: 8033, : 705


Samurai accountant: a theory of auditing and plunger


:  Border K. C. / Sobel J. .
:  
:  1987
:  
:  Review of Economic Studies
() :  3
:  Vol. 54
:  Border K.C., Sobel J. Samurai accountant: a theory of auditing and plunger // Review of Economic Studies. 1987. Vol. 54. 3. P. 525 540.
:  
:  
:  

: 5288, : 0


Theory of moves


:  Brams S. J.
:  
( ):  Univ. of Cambridge
:  1995
:  
:  Brams S.J. Theory of moves. Cambridge: Univ. of Cambridge, 1995. 248 p.
:  
:  

: 5529, : 0


Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge


:  Brandenburger A. . / Dekel E. .
:  
:  1993
:  
:  Journal of Economic Theory
:  Vol. 59
:  Brandenburger A., Dekel E. Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge // Journal of Economic Theory. 1993. Vol. 59. P. 189 198.
:   ( )
:  
:  

: 5731, : 0


Employee attitudes and employee performance


:  Brayfield A. H. / Crockett W. H.
:  
:  1955
:  
:  Psychological Bulletin
:  Vol. 52
:  Brayfield A.H., Crockett W.H. Employee attitudes and employee performance // Psychological Bulletin. 1955. Vol. 52. P. 396 424.
:  

: 5674, : 0


Project characteristics that influence the implementation of Project Management techniques: a survey


:  Bubshait K. A. / Selen W. J.
:  
:  1992
:  
:  International Journal of Project Management
() :  2
:  23
:  Bubshait K.A., Selen W.J. Project characteristics that influence the implementation of Project Management techniques: a survey // International Journal of Project Management. 1992. Vol. 23. N 2. P. 43 47.
:  

: 6182, : 0


Problems of optimum distribution of resources


:  Burkov V. N.
:  
:  1972
:   ..
:  Control and Cybernetics
() :  1/2
:  Vol. 1
:  Burkov V.N. Problems of optimum distribution of resources // Control and Cybernetics. 1972. Vol. 1. N. 1/2. P. 27-41.
:  The optimum distribution of a limited quantity of resources, is one of the most important trend in the theory of network planning and of control. Problems of an optimum distribution of resources, are in principle extremal problems of combinational type. At present there are no effective and accurate methods for the solution of such problems. A satisfactory developed theory exists only for the problems where ordering of the network events is assumed. The paper considers basic results and methods of optimum distribution of resources, when the network events are ordered.

.
. . , . .

Problemy optymalnego rozdziału ograniczonych zasobów są jednym z najważniejszych kierunków teorii sterowania i planowania sieciowego. Optymalny rozdział zasobów jest w zasadzie zagadnieniem ekstremalnym typu kombinatorycznego. Obecnie nie ma efektywnych i dokładnych metod rozwiązywania takich zagadnień. Wystarczająco opracowana jest jedynie teoria dotycząca zagadnień, w których zakłada się uporządkowanie zdarzeń sieci. W pracy niniejszej rozpatrzono
podstawowe wyniki i metody optymalnego rozdziału zasobów uzyskane przy założeniu, że zdarzenia sieci są uporządkowane.
:  
:  
:  


: (pdf)
: 9816, : 3627


Stimulation and decision-making in the active systems theory: review of problems and new results


:  Burkov V. N. / Enaleev A. K.
:  
:  1994
:  
:  Mathematical Social Sciences
:  Vol. 27
:  Burkov V.N., Enaleev A.K. Stimulation and decision-making in the active systems theory: review of problems and new results // Mathematical Social Sciences. 1994. Vol. 27. P. 271 291.
:  
:   ( )
:  
:  
:  

: 8675, : 0


Fairplay in control of active systems


:  Burkov V. N. / Lerner A. .
:  
( ):  North-Holland Publishing Company
:  1971
:  
:  Differential games and related topics
:  Burkov V.N., Lerner A. Ya. Fairplay in control of active systems / Differential games and related topics. Amsterdam, London: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1971. P. 164 168.
:  Large-scale manmachine systems incorporate subsystems whose goals do not generally coincide with the of the system. A single man or a group of people make a subsystem actively maximize its objective function by reporting the information on its model (in other words on its potential) to an external control unit. Besides the subsystem has certain information on the strategy applied by the external control unit and by other subsystems and uses this information in its own interests. This lecture is concerned with control of such active systems that incorporate men and groups of people that are after their own goals. The control problem is to find an optimal plan for the system so that the subsystems plans be also optimal. A solution of the control problem based on the fair play principle is proposed. This principle largely recognizes the active nature of the subsystems.


:   ( )
:  
:  
:  


: (pdf)
: (php)
: 9492, : 1706


Hitchhikers guide to Project Management


:  Buttle T. A.
:  
:  1997
:  
:  PMI Symposium
:  Buttle T. A Hitchhikers guide to Project Management / PMI Symposium. Chicago, 1997. P. 89 97.
:  

: 5489, : 0


Human resource management


:  Byars L. L. / Leslie W. R.
:  
( ):  Homewood
:  1991
:  
:  Byars L.L., Leslie W.R. Human resource management. Boston: Homewood, 1991. 545 p.
:  

: 5776, : 0


Information mirages in experimental asset markets


:  Camerer C. . / Weigelt K. .
:  
:  1991
:  
:  Journal of Business
:  Vol. 64
:  Camerer C., Weigelt K. Information mirages in experimental asset markets // Journal of Business. 1991. Vol. 64. P. 463 493.
:   ( )
:  

: 5050, : 0


Incentives, motivation and economic information


:  Campbell D. E.
:  
( ):  Cambridge University Press
:  1995
:  
:  Campbell D.E. Incentives, motivation and economic information. Cambridge University Press, 1995. 355 p.
:  

: 5495, : 0


Theory of wages and employment


:  Cartter A. M.
:  
( ):  Homewood
:  1959
:  
:  Cartter A.M. Theory of wages and employment. Boston: Homewood, 1959. 193 p.
:  

: 5050, : 0


A general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement


:  Chander P. . / Wilde L. .
:  
:  1998
:  
:  Review of Economic Studies
:  Vol. 65
:  Chander P., Wilde L. A general characterization of optimal income tax enforcement // Review of Economic Studies. 1998. Vol. 65. P.165 - 183.
:  

: 5037, : 0


Corruption in tax administration


:  Chander P. . / Wilde L. .
:  
:  1992
:  
:  Journal of public Economics
() :  2
:  Vol. 49
:  Chander P., Wilde L. Corruption in tax administration // Journal of public Economics. 1992. Vol. 49. 2. P. 333 - 349.
:  

: 5090, : 0


Involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts


:  Chari V. .
:  
:  1983
:  
:  Quarterly Journal of Economics
:  Chari V. Involuntary unemployment and implicit contracts // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1983. Supplement. P. 19 36.
:   ( )
:  
:  

: 4770, : 0


Soft systems methodology in action


:  Checland P. B. / Scholes I. .
:  
( ):  Wiley
:  1990
:  
:  Checland P.B., Scholes I. Soft systems methodology in action. Chichester: Wiley, 1990.
:  

: 4959, : 0


Fuzzy multiple attribute decision-making: methods and applications


:  Chen S. J. / Hwong C. L.
:  
( ):  Springer-Verlag
:  1992
:  
:  Chen S.J., Hwong C.L. Fuzzy multiple attribute decision-making: methods and applications. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1992. 540 p.
:  

: 5264, : 0


An analysis of costs overruns on defense acquisition contracts


:  Christensen D. S.
:  
:  1993
:  
:  International Journal of Project Management
() :  3
:  24
:  Christensen D.S. An analysis of costs overruns on defense acquisition contracts // International Journal of Project Management. 1993. Vol. 24. N 3. P. 43 48.
:  

: 4728, : 0


The estimate at complete problem: a review of three studies


:  Christensen D. S.
:  
:  1993
:  
:  International Journal of Project Management
() :  1
:  24
:  Christensen D.S. The estimate at complete problem: a review of three studies // International Journal of Project Management. 1993. Vol. 24. N 1. P. 37 42.
:  

: 4987, : 0


A review of cost/schedule control systems criteria literature


:  Christinsen D. S.
:  
:  1994
:  
:  International Journal of Project Management
() :  3
:  25
:  Christinsen D.S. A review of cost/schedule control systems criteria literature // International Journal of Project Management. 1994. Vol. 25. N 3. P. 32 39.
:  

: 4846, : 0



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