:Burkov V. N. / Novikov D. A. : : 1994 : : Proceedings of X-th IC on Systems Engineering : B.H., .. Active systems theory and contract theory: comparison of ideas and results. Coventry: Proceedings of X-th IC on Systems Engineering. 1994 : ( ) : : :
:Novikov D. A. : : 2001 : : Systems Science () : 2 : Vol. 26 : Novikov D.A. Management of active systems: stability or efficiency // Systems science. 2001. Vol. 26. 2. P. 85 93. : The analysis of the solutions stability, as well as the analysis of models adequacy, is performed on the basis of the unified approach, which exploits the concept of the generalized solution of the active systems management problem. : ( ) : : :
:Novikov D. A. / Burkov V. N. : ( ): Technica : 1995 : : Business and management : .., .. Active systems theory and problems of large-scale projects management / Business and management. Vilnius: Technica, 1995. Vol. 1. P. 93 103. : ( ) : : :
:Burkov V. N. / Novikov D. A. : ( ): Proceedings of 14-th IFAC World Congress : 1999 : : Burkov V.N., Novikov D.A. Fuzzy incentive problem / Proceedings of 14-th IFAC World Congress. Beijing. China. 1999. Vol. L. P. 345 349. : Game-theoretical model of the incentive mechanism is considered for the agency, which is embedded in fuzzy environment. The paper includes the solution of fuzzy incentive problem and the analysis of uncertainty influence on the efficiency of management. : ( ) : : :
:Novikov D. A. : ( ): Proceedings of 14-th International Conference on S : 2001 : : Proceedings of 14-th International Conference on S : Novikov D.A. Incentives in organizations: theory and practice / Proceedings of 14-th International Conference on Systems Science. Wroclaw, 2001. Vol. 2. P. 19 29. : The paper contains the consideration of the modern state of art of incentive models and their applications. In the framework of the management theory incentive problems are mostly studied for simplest organizations which consist of one principal and one agent. Game-theoretical problem is for-mulated as following. Agent's goal function reflects his preferences over the set of feasible actions and depends on his own strategy and on the strategy of the principal. The game solution set is defined as the set of the equilibriums under the given management. The management problem is to maximize the guaranteed efficiency of man-agement. As the basic model, briefly described above, considers the simplest organization intellectual active system (IAS), which consists of one principal and one agent, who make their decisions under complete information, the extensions of the basic model are generated by complicating sequentially the model. Any IAS is described by the following parameters: elements of the IAS (principals, agents, etc.); its structure (the set of relations between the elements); feasible sets of elements strategies; goal functions of the elements; information possessed by the elements at the moments of their decisions making; the sequence of getting the information and making decisions. Thus main extensions of the basic model are: multi-agent IAS; dynamic IAS; multilevel IAS; IAS with distributed control; IAS, which operate under uncertain environment or/and incomplete information. The main problem, which arises when applying results of theoretical investigation in practice, is the problem of IAS identification. Nowadays several levels of detailing exist. The most general one is to identify classes of possible values of IAS parameters. Sometimes such a general information (for example, corresponding to the assumptions of convexity of sets and functions in the model) is sufficient for restricting the class of optimal control variables. The next stage of detailing is the introduction of certain assumptions about classification of the models parameters. And, at least, the last stage is to assign certain numeric values to the parameters of the model. This stage, being based correctly through natural or simulation experiments, allows to make reasonable conclusions about the optimal control. : ( ) : : :
:Burkov V. N. / Novikov D. A. / Petrakov S. N. : : 1999 : : Systems Science () : 1 : 25 : Burkov V.N., Novikov D.A., Petrakov S.N. Mechanism design in economies with private goods: truthtelling and feasible message sets // Systems Science. 1999. Vol. 25. N 1. P. 71 - 78. : ( ) : : : /
:Burkov V. N. / Novikov D. A. : : 1999 : : Systems Science () : 2 : 25 : Burkov V.N., Novikov D.A. Models and methods of multiprojects' management // Systems Science. 1999. Vol. 25. N 2. P. 5 - 14. : : / : /
:Novikov D. A. / Chkhartishvili A. G. : : 2004 : : 2 : Novikov D.A., Chkhartishvili A.G. Models of reflexive decision-making / Proceedings of 15th International Conference on Systems Science. Wroclaw, 2004. Volume 2. P. 295 306. : The paper contains the survey of the game-theoretical models of reflexive decision-making. Most of equilibrium concepts, used in the game theory, require that the parameters of the game are common knowledge all agents know it, all agents know that all agents know it and so on ad infinitum. In the general case the agents have different beliefs about beliefs of each other, thus an infinite (reflexive) belief structure appears. For this case the concept of informational equilibrium is fruitful. The paper is devoted to the formulation of the reflexive model, and contains conditions of the reflexive equilibrium existence and stability, solution of the reflexivity depth problem for some cases, and examples. : ( ) : / : / : / /
:Burkov V. N. / Novikov D. A. / Balashov V. G. / Zalojnev A. Y. : : 2003 : : Journal of business economics and management () : 2 : 4 : Balashov V.G., Burkov V.N., Novikov D.A., Zalojnev A.Yu. Incentives in hierarchical organizations // Journal of business economics and management. 2003. Vol. IV. 2. P. 81 - 85. : ( ) : / : / :
:Novikov D. A. : : 1997 : : Incentives in organizations: uncertainty and efficiency / Proceedings of 6-th IFAC Symposium on Automated Systems Based on Human Skills, 17-19 Sept. 1997. , Kranjska gora. P. 274 - 277. : ( ) :
:Novikov D. A. : ( ): Dogus University : 2007 : : Novikov D.A. A model of the hierarchy of needs dynamics / IFAC Symposium on Computational Economics and Financial and Industrial Systems. Istanbul: Dogus University, 2007. P. 428 430. : A formal model is proposed for the hierarchy of needs dynamics, where the degree of satisfaction of each individual need depends on the resource and the degree of satisfaction of the lower-level needs. Direct and inverse problems of resource allocation are solved, and the set of critical resources is determined. The conditions for attainability of the given level of need satisfaction are established, and the problem of resource allocation is reduced to the optimal control problem. : ( ) / ( ) : / : / : / /
:Novikov D. A. / Goubko M. V. : : 2004 : : Goubko M.V., Novikov D.A. Magement in organizations: collective decision-making / Proceedings of the 16-th International Conference on Systems Engineering, Coventry, 2004. Vol. 2, P. 515 519. : Game-theoretical model of the agents coalitional in-teractions is proposed. General management problem is formulated. The incentive problems in radial and common-agency organization structures with coalitional interactions are solved. The processes of system structure changes because of coalitional interactions are analysed. The resource allocation problem in the system with coalitional interactions of agents is solved. : ( ) / ( ) : : / : / /
:Novikov D. A. : : 2001 : .. : Systems Science () : 26 : 2 : Novikov D.A. Management of active systems: stability or efficiency // Systems science. 2001. Vol. 26. 2. P. 85 93. : The analysis of the solutions stability, as well as the analysis of models adequacy, is performed on the basis of the unified approach, which exploits the concept of the generalised solution of the active systems (organisational or socio-economic systems) control problem. : :
:Novikov D. A. : : 2001 : : Novikov D.A. Incentives in multi-agent systems / Proceedings of 2-nd Workshop on Agent-based simulation. April 2-4 2001, Passau, Germany. P. 134 137. : The incentive problem for multi-agent active system (AS) is solved on the basis of the agents game decomposition, i.e. by the construction of the incentive system, which implements the optimal (from principals point of view) strategies of the agents as the dominant strategies equilibrium (DSE). The problem of information aggregation in multi-agent systems is also considered. : ( ) : : :
:Novikov D. A. : : 2008 : : Novikov D.A. Team building under Pareto uncertainty / Proceedings of the 17th World Congress of The International Federation of Automatic Control. Seoul, Korea, July 6-11, 2008. P. 1633 1638. : Game-theoretical models of team-building and team incentive problems are described. Solutions of these problems are obtained for the case of probabilistic uncertainty of the team members abilities. Conditions of team vitality are formulated in terms of the distribution and the reservation utility properties. : ( ) / ( ) : / : / / : / /
: . . / . . : ( ): SPbGU : 2008 : : Collected abstracts of papers, presented in the International Conference "Game Theory and Management" : Goubko M., Novikov D. Game-theoretical Models and Methods of the Organizational Systems Control Theory // Game Theory and Management. Collected abstracts of papers, presented in the International Conference "Game Theory and Management", Gradual School of Management, SPbU, 2008.
: ( ): Coventry University : 2010 : : Proceedings of UKACC International Conference on CONTROL : Chkhartishvili A.G., Gubanov D.A., Korgin N.A., Novikov D.A. Models of Reputation Dynamics in Expertise by Social Networks. / Proceedings of UKACC International Conference on CONTROL, Coventry: Coventry University, 2010. P. 203 210. :
: ( ): HSE : 2010 : : X International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare : Gubanov D.A., Korgin N.A., Novikov D.A. Network expertise and dynamics of reputation / X International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. Moscow: HSE, 2010. P. 27. :
: : 2013 : .. : Advances in Systems Science and Application () : Vol. 13. 1 : V.N. Burkov, M.V. Goubko, N.A. Korgin, D.A. Novikov Mechanisms of Organizational Behavior Control: A Survey // Advances in Systems Science and Application. 2013. Vol. 13. 1. P. 1 20. : Basics are surveyed of a version of mechanism design theory tailored to solve management problems. The concept of a mechanism of organizational behavior control is introduced. Methodological grounds of the theory are discussed along with mechanisms classification. Mechanism implementation process is characterized. Also, basic mechanisms are sketched, which help solving important management problems on all stages of management cycle. An example of the mechanism of incentive-compatible planning is considered.
: : 2013 : .. : Advances in Systems Science and Application () : Vol. 13. 3 : Burkov V.N., Goubko M.V., Korgin N.A., Novikov D.A. Integrated Mechanisms of Organizational Behavior Control // Advances in Systems Science and Application. 2013. Vol. 13. No 3. P. 217 225. : Problems of control mechanisms integration are formulated and discussed in the framework of mechanism design for organizational behavior control. Unified schemes for control mechanisms description and design are proposed. An example of the integrated production cycle optimization mechanism is considered.
: ( ): Springer International Publishing : 2014 : : Gubanov, D., Korgin, N., Novikov, D., & Raikov, A. E-Expertise: Modern Collective Intelligence. / Series:Studies in Computational Intelligence. vol. 558.-Springer International Publishing. 2014. p. 112 : This book focuses on organization and mechanisms of expert decision-making support using modern information and communication technologies, as well as information analysis and collective intelligence technologies (electronic expertise or simply e-expertise).
: : 2014 : .. : Studia Humana () : 3 : Novikov D. A., Chkhartishvili A. G. Graph of a Reflexive Game and Bélles-léttres // Studia Humana. 2014. 3. P. 11 - 15. : ( ) : : /
: : 2014 : .. : Advances in Systems Science and Applications () : 3 : Novikov D. A., Chkhartishvili A. G. Mathematical Models of Informational and Strategic Reflexion: a Survey // Advances in Systems Science and Applications. 2014. 3. P. 254 - 277. : ( ) : : :
: 2013 : IFAC Conference on Manufacturing Modelling, Management and Control : Bahktadze N. N., Novikov D. A., Vassilyev S. N. Intelligent Control of Industrial Processes // Proceedings of IFAC Conference on Manufacturing Modelling, Management and Control, St. Petersburg, 2013. P. 49 57. :
: ( ): Springer : 2017 : : Breer V.V., Novikov D.A., Rogatkin A.D. Mob Control: Models of Threshold Collective Behavior. Series: Studies in Systems, Decision and Control. Heidelberg: Springer, 2017. 134 p. : The book is dedicated to mathematical models of mob control with thresh-old (conformity) collective decision-making of the agents.
Based on the analysis results of the interconnection between the micro- and macromodels of active network structures, the static (deterministic, stochastic and game-theoretic) and dynamic (discrete- and continuous-time) models of mob control are considered. Much attention is given to models of informational confrontation. Many results are applicable not only to mob control problems, but also to control problems arising in social groups, online social networks, etc.
The book is intended to the researchers and practitioners, as well as the undergraduate and postgraduate students, doctoral candidates specializing in the field of collective behavior modeling.
