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Aumann R J

:  Aumann R J
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:  74615
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:  0
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Aumann R.J. Agreeing to disagree // The Annals of Statistics. 1976. Vol. 4. 6. P. 1236 1239.
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Aumann R.J. Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge // International Journal of Game theory. 1999. 28. P. 263 300.
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Aumann R.J., Brandenbunger A. Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium // Econometrica. 1995. Vol. 63. 5. P. 1161 1180.
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Aumann R.J., Heifetz A. Incomplete information . Handbook of Game Theory. Vol III. Chapter 43. Amsterdam, Elseiver (forthcoming).
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Aumann R.J., Mashler H.L. Repeated games with incomplete information. MIT Press, 1995. 342 p.
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Aumann R.J., Mashler M. The bargaining set for cooperative games // Advances in Game Theory. Ann. Math. Studies. 52. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964.
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